Weekly Seminar

Peter Katuščák

CERGE-EI, Prague

26-Apr-2013

Seminar 3 – 14:30

Abstract

Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in the first price auction? Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain their finding by anticipated regret combined with the assumption that feedback directly affects salience of regret relative to material payoff. We revisit this impor- tant market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any systematic effect of feedback on the average bid/value ratio. This evidence contradicts a presence of anticipated regret or its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auc-tions.

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