Seminario Applied

Bas van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam


Seminar 3 – 14:30


This paper assesses the performance of different school assignment mechanisms in the context of secondary education in Amsterdam. To do so, we complemented the current Boston-type mechanism with a survey that elicits students’ ordinal and cardinal preferences. We find evidence that a substantial number of students behave strategically under the current system. Simulations show that Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) dominates the current system in terms of the number of students being placed in more preferred schools. Deferred Acceptance places fewer students in their most preferred school than the current system or RSD, but more students in their top 3. This comes, however, at the cost of substantial (Pareto) inefficiency. (Joint with Pieter Gautier, Monique de Haan, and Hessel Oosterbeek)

Deja un comentario

Tu dirección de correo electrónico no será publicada. Los campos requeridos están marcados *

Puedes usar las siguientes HTML etiquetas y atributos: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

borrar formularioEnviar

Este sitio usa Akismet para reducir el spam. Aprende cómo se procesan los datos de tus comentarios.