Seminari Micro

Luis Corchón (with Marco Serena)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid


Seminar 3 – 14:30


In this paper we explore the properties of Nash equilibrium in contests. We find that any function can be rationalized as the best reply of a player in a contest.When the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero there are several properties that must hold in equilibrium. Finally we explore the implementation of the results of a contests and find that any result is implementable in Nash equilibrium.

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