Seminario Theory-Experimental

Haihan Yu

U. Alicante

5-Oct-2015

Seminar 3 – 14:30

Resumen

This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on the tension between individual incentives and information revelation in sequential strategic setups with incomplete information. Our results indicate that subjects successfully misrepresent their signals, instead of shading their private information, as equilibrium behavior would prescribe, but the benefits from mispresenting signals are offset by positional disadvantages.

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