Seminari Theory-Experimental

Haihan Yu

U. Alicante


Seminar 3 – 14:30


This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on the tension between individual incentives and information revelation in sequential strategic setups with incomplete information. Our results indicate that subjects successfully misrepresent their signals, instead of shading their private information, as equilibrium behavior would prescribe, but the benefits from mispresenting signals are offset by positional disadvantages.

Leave Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

clear formSubmit

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.