Seminari Theory-Experimental

Ádám Telek

University of Alicante


Seminar 3 – 14:30


In this paper I build a model to study electoral outcome with a special focus on interpersonal ties in the society. I argue that in some cases studying the ideology of the electorate is not the right way to understand the result of an election. In little electorates or in committees the personal connections can be much more important. I develop a voting model where these connections add up to a social network and in this model I study the basic questions of the citizen-candidate literature: who runs for office, and who wins the election? I analyze the outcome of the voting game in general networks and then I prove the existence of political equilibrium and identify the important (winning and pivotal) players in a wide range of network classes. I find the somewhat unexpected result that the most influential player does not always win the election, and she is not necessarily the one with the most connections: the global position in the network is a more important determinant.

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