Seminari Theory-Experimental

Bernardo Garcia Pola



Seminar 3 – 14:30


On the one hand, compared to the standard equilibrium predictions, non-equilibrium behavioral rules show to be better in explaining individuals’ initial play in games. On the other, different learning models show to be successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior over time in games, when individuals have opportunity to learn from past behavior. This study links both concepts. How do different behavioral rules in initial responses modify their behavior over time? We use normal-form games and guessing games to elicit initial responses to games and learning rules over time. We classify individuals into different behavioral rules in initial play and learning rules over time and test if and/or how they relate to each other. In particular, we focus on whether naivete and sophistication in initial play correlates with naivete and sophistication in learning rules.

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