Theory-Experimental Seminar

Kemal Yildiz

Bilkent University


seminar – 14:30


We propose and analyze modular stable matching rules as a candidate for a foundational framework to address issues of social welfare and equity in the stable matching model. We present two characterizations for modular stable matching rules that reveal the ordinal content of optimizing a modular function under the stability constraint, and present several examples. Then, we propose a new equity notion and characterize the class of modular stable matching rules that comply with this notion. Our analysis indicates that modular matching rules are both structured and rich enough to implement a wide range of objectives.

Leave Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

clear formSubmit

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.