International Journal of Game Theory – 39, 1, (2010) 209-222
Resum: We study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods among a group of agents when monetary compensations are possible. In the first part of the paper we consider the case where each agent receives, at most, one indivisible good. We prove that the set of equilibrium allocations of any direct revelation game associated with a subsolution of the No-Envy solution coincides with the set of envy-free allocations for the true preferences. Under manipulation all the subsolutions of the No-Envy solution are equivalent. In the second part of the paper, we allow each agent to receive more than one indivisible good. In this situation the above characterization does not hold any more. We prove that any Equal Income Walrasian allocation for the true preferences can be supported as an equilibrium allocation of any direct revelation game associated with subsolutions of the No-Envy solution, but also non-efficient allocations can be supported.