Seminario Theory-Experimental

David Rojo Arjona

U. Leicester


Seminar 1 – 14:30


We investigate the effects of leadership on cooperation in repeated social dilemmas. Leadership stems from having the authority to allocate funds and/or from having a central position in the network. In some treatments, players can exclude others from further participation. We find that though players with authority are more cooperative than those without, they are quickly excluded. In stark contrast, central players are less cooperative than others and this free riding is tolerated. Our results suggest that while lower cooperation by leaders might be permitted, even the opportunity to appropriate group surplus is not tolerated.

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