Seminario Theory-Experimental

Kemal Yildiz

Bilkent University

17-Oct-2022

seminar – 14:30

Resumen

We propose and analyze modular stable matching rules as a candidate for a foundational framework to address issues of social welfare and equity in the stable matching model. We present two characterizations for modular stable matching rules that reveal the ordinal content of optimizing a modular function under the stability constraint, and present several examples. Then, we propose a new equity notion and characterize the class of modular stable matching rules that comply with this notion. Our analysis indicates that modular matching rules are both structured and rich enough to implement a wide range of objectives.

Deja un comentario

Tu dirección de correo electrónico no será publicada. Los campos requeridos están marcados *

Puedes usar las siguientes HTML etiquetas y atributos: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>

borrar formularioEnviar

Este sitio usa Akismet para reducir el spam. Aprende cómo se procesan los datos de tus comentarios.